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Delaware Private Arbitration: Its Practicality,
Constitutionality, and Potential Influence on Other States
Christopher Martin, Hon. Clifford Meacham, and Gregory Varallo,
with John Mark Zeberkiewicz as Moderator
SAM FAYE: Keeping with the same subject of the Delaware pri-
vate arbitration program and what has been discussed, I'm going to
invite Mr. Chris Martin back up, who is going to get involved in this
discussion, and also the Honorable Clifford Meacham, who is a retired
Cook County judge and currently acts as a neutral for JAMS. And I
think these guys are just going to get into a discussion based on the
previous presentation, and Judge Meacham and Mr. Martin will give
their insight on the Delaware program based on practicing in Illinois.
So all yours, gentlemen.
CHRISTOPHER MARTIN: Do you think it would be good to start
with just a little background very briefly on the constitutionality issue
and what's being raised and how perhaps?
HON. CLIFFORD MEACHAM: Can we do something before we
get to that point?
CHRISTOPHER MARTIN: Sure.
HON. CLIFFORD MEACHAM: I used to teach law, and I always
had some mantras that I would share with my students, the first of
which is good lawyers are good plumbers. No matter how smart you
are, what your client wants is a result. And if you can solve the prob-
lem instead of fight the problem, you are much, much better off.
And this is a pretty sophisticated topic here. And what I would like
to do is just ensure that everybody has an appreciation of what it re-
ally means to participate in alternative dispute resolution. So in Cook
County, it's a little bit of a different animal than it is in Delaware
obviously. In Cook County, there is the Chancery Division. It's sepa-
rate and apart from the Law Division and the First Municipal Division
and the like. The Chancery Division has a mediation rule, which gives
the chancellors the authority to order a mediation.' There is actually
a Law Division mediation rule as well.2
1. COOK. CNTY. CIR. CT. R. 21.01-21.11.
2. COOK. CNTY. CIR. CT. R. 20.01-20.11.
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And there are people who have been approved for mediations
under both the Law Division mediation rule and the Chancery Divi-
sion rule, and there's also a provision if the parties can't agree-well,
first of all, let me back up and say if the parties select someone that is
not on the approved listing, the court will go along with it. And if the
parties can't agree, the court will order a mediation and select
somebody.
So there is a very active alternative dispute resolution process in the
State of Illinois, as there are in several other states. And one of the
other things that I just wanted to mention briefly is that the Delaware
law is really interesting from my perspective. There is another area of
the country that has an interesting alternative dispute resolution pro-
cess, and that's California where they have both constitutional and
statutory authority for private judges under the auspices of the circuit
court, the various and sundry circuit courts of California, and they use
many retired judges to adjudicate their disputes.
The advantages, of course, being time, money, and experience. You
can select your judge. So there are a lot of different ways to go about
this. From my perspective, good lawyers, again, can do a lot of things
to frame issues to make life easier for judges and their clients. For
example, in Illinois, we would-oftentimes where we have a pure legal
issue that you talked about, if it's ninety days, we would invite cross-
motions for summary judgment.
If the issue was one purely of law, it's nice to identify it. And I
completely agree, the best service you can do for your client is to re-
ally focus in on what does the adjudicator have to decide. Is it a ques-
tion of law? Is it a question of fact? Is it a mixed question of law and
fact?
Oftentimes, there are stipulated bench trials. So if you have a stipu-
lated set of facts, the judge is in a position to make a determination.
Courts here in Illinois engage in a tremendous number of pretrials,
and you kind of get two shots at the apple as well. Because you can
ask your judge, the assigned chancery judge, if he will conduct a pre-
trial. Most will. Some are reluctant to do so. But within the division,
there's the opportunity to ask your judge if he will send it to some-
body else to conduct the pretrial. Sometimes it's a good thing.
The Cook County experience in terms of agreeing to a particular
judge did not work out very well, and there was the Greylord scan-
dals, as I'm sure something that you're not aware of, but some years
ago, a number of Cook County judges wound up going to federal
prison. And it's Cook County, what can you do?
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They give you a test here and you have to finish high on the test in
order to serve as a judge in Cook County. It's not like you just win an
election or anything like that. Please. Appreciate the fact that half of
this is tongue in cheek.
GREGORY VARALLO: Which half, Judge?
HON. CLIFFORD MEACHAM: Both halves. No fair making the
judge blush. What these gentlemen are saying is really extremely val-
uable because you have to work with your client to put together what
you need in order to be able to effectively represent your client.
And sooner is always better than later insofar as I'm concerned.
Again, just to go back briefly, if you can identify whether it's a pure
question of law, a question of fact, a mixed question of law and fact
and if you can agree with your opponent on what it is, that can really
shorten the process.
Whether it's a trial, a pretrial, or an arbitration under this system,
the Delaware system, you can really tailor your case to the particular
needs. And identifying the right person to make the adjudication is
critical. Some people are wonderful mediators. Some people are
great arbitrators.
Recognize, too, that there are different styles. There are facilitative
mediators. There are evaluative mediators, and the best kind of medi-
ator is facilitative until he can't stand it anymore, and then says,
"Does anybody want to know what I think?" And when the answer
is, "Okay," that's the Dracula moment where the mediator stabs both
sides in the heart and says, "This is what you ought to do, and the
answer to why, because I say so."
Edward Bennett Williams, the famous Washington attorney, once
was given a long letter and it said, "What should I do?" And Edward
Bennett Williams wrote him back and said, "Do nothing," with a bill
for $20,000. And the lawyer wrote back and said, "I don't really ap-
preciate your thoughts. It's really valuable, but my client would really
like to know the basis for your reasoning." And Edward Bennett Wil-
liams wrote him back and said, "Because I say so," with a bill for
$10,000.
I don't subscribe to that, and I really am a big believer in clients
having the opportunity to participate, and judges and/or mediators
and/or arbitrators have the absolute obligation to say who wins and
why. I don't like judges that just say judgment for defendant, judg-
ment for plaintiff.
One of the best things you can do, I think, to help lawyers and their
clients is to give them the basis for your opinion. Sometimes (and,
again, you haven't been in a courtroom setting yet, I presume, but in
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federal court I practiced for many years. I was a member of the De-
partment of Justice) we would put together proposed findings of fact
and conclusions of law, and we would submit them to the judge and
produce the evidence premarked, and the judge would have our pro-
posed findings of fact and our exhibits, and he would have the other
side's proposed findings of fact and conclusions of law and their
exhibits.
So by the time we got to trial, if we were able to stipulate to Exhib-
its 1-900, then we didn't have to lay a foundation for all those exhib-
its. They were in the record already. And instead of laying the
foundation for each one of them, you just hand them up and every-
body follows along.
By the way, use real-time if you have a complicated case. That's
where the court reporter takes your-and she can read back the ques-
tion and life is so much easier and everybody gets their own disk, and
it's a much better way to try cases.
In any event, if you understand what the issues are and if you can
tailor the case-most cases, when they're filed in chancery, for exam-
ple, I would get cases with three, four or five, ten, fifteen, twenty
counts, and many times there would be counterclaims, cross-claims,
third-party claims. But usually cases could be distilled into four or
five key issues. And if you understood what those issues were and
you could frame those issues accurately-and again, that's the value
of having somebody as an arbitrator or a mediator who has a good
deal of experience-then you can focus on those issues, get a result,
and call the next case.
So again, the way to practice law is to make it easy for the judge
and/or the adjudicator, and the way to do that is to do a bang-up job
to understand that there is an evidentiary universe. And before you
sit down to draft your complaint, it's always a good idea to think
about what do I have to prove eventually to get to the point of putting
my dog and pony show on.
And you will find that sometimes your legal theory will change de-
pending upon the facts because litigation is a moving target. I think
it's going to be here, take a couple of depositions. I thought your
comment about amendments was valuable. Don't get stuck identify-
ing a narrower range of issues than might eventually exist. The issue
may be different after you've gone through some discovery. So, you
know, that's my two cents, and now we can talk about the majesty of
the constitutional issues that are raised here.
CHRISTOPHER MARTIN: One thing I wanted to add to that. As
law students, what I found is you might have somewhat of a miscon-
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ception that the judge is going to do a lot of this stuff for you in terms
of defining the litigation, and it's really your case, right?
The judge and/or the arbitrator is relying on you to bring forth what
the issues are and to define the scope of them. So don't think that this
is going to be done for you, that the judge is up there making all these
decisions. They do make decisions, but they make the decisions based
on what you bring them.
So it's on you to define the scope of the litigation or the arbitration.
And that's a very important point that I think, as students, you want
to understand because, going back to my cost talk, that's going to have
a big impact on what the final bill is on how this all comes out. As
Judge Meacham just said, if you come forward with fifteen or sixteen
counts and most of them are going to do nothing but create noise and
noise costs money, that's a big part of the ultimate length of the trial
or arbitration and the amount that your client's going to end up
paying.
GREGORY VARALLO: Let me add to that, if I can, and under-
line it. What we do as advocates is communicate, and we communi-
cate hopefully in a way that helps the judge do his or her job more
effectively.
And what you don't see until you've been around for a while is just
how busy the judges you appear before really are and, honestly, just
how little time they have to devote to any one matter. You live with
the matter for days or weeks prior to coming in for an argument, and
because you know it inside and out, you expect that the judge does.
Well, I've never been a judge, but I suspect your Honor could tell us
that in any one matter, you might have two or three hours at most to
think about the matter before you take the bench. And so it's your
job to narrow it and communicate it in a way that anybody can under-
stand it, so that an accomplished jurist takes it and runs with it.
Also, I have to say that I received an opinion from Vice Chancellor
Glasscock last week on a complicated matter that was made unduly
complicated by the other side. And the vice chancellor, in describing
the plaintiff's multifaceted complaint, said that they took advice from
the Vice President of the United States and then he dropped a foot-
note in. He said, "Buy a shotgun, buy a shotgun."
HON. CLIFFORD MEACHAM: That's extremely true. I will
often tell people in a mediation context I am the person who knows
least about the conflict in the room. The lawyers have to live with it
for a very, very long time. I have a mediation on Monday, and I don't
even have the submissions as I sit here. So my weekend will be spent
looking at submissions. And again, what I do is I analyze what we
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need to do in order to get to an adjudication, a point where we can
adjudicate and/or mediate effectively.
And in this case, it's a four-party mediation. Everybody's got an
opinion, subrogation, indemnification. Don't make it harder than it
has to be. I get to have breakfast almost every morning with a num-
ber of appellate court justices and meet up old trial court judges, and
it is a very common refrain that lawyers tend to make things too
complicated.
I will tell my students to practice your argument in front of your
bartender, your wife, your significant other, and if they start dazing
off, you know you will have lost them. So when you're in a position to
make that argument, never, ever say, "I'll get back to that." Listen to
the question, answer the question. If you don't know the answer, you
can vamp a little and say, "Well, what we need is this," but answer the
question and keep it, distill it down so that your argument is clear and
consistent.
If you get caught up in one of the backwaters of esoteric argument,
that isn't going to help the court, yourself or your client.
GREGORY VARALLO: I have to add, Judge, that I don't get an
opportunity to try jury cases very often because I practice in a court
that doesn't have juries. But every time I'm privileged enough to be
before a jury, I have a simple rule. And my wife's a very intelligent,
very educated woman, but if she doesn't understand me the first time
through, I work on that argument until she understands precisely what
I'm saying and gets me to the point where I want to get.
I don't prejudice her in advance. I say, "Will you listen to my argu-
ment?" And if she's got questions, guaranteed that the jury's going to
have questions because she's really smart and she picks it up right
away.
If you can't talk to a non-lawyer and you're going to go talk to
eleven, twelve, or six of them depending upon your jurisdiction,
you're not going to do very well, so make sure you can explain it to a
non-lawyer quickly and concisely before you get in front of that jury.
So now back to arbitration.
CHRISTOPHER MARTIN: I think it would be beneficial maybe
just to get a little summary from our Delaware colleagues about the
constitutionality of the issue and where it stands and what the argu-
ments are.
JOHN MARK ZEBERKIEWICZ: Speaking of distilling things
down, we'll take it in three very small steps. We provided in the
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materials a copy of the memorandum opinion from the district court
that found this whole regime unconstitutional. 3
We didn't provide Greg's dissent or his hand-marked copy of the
opinion because we wanted you to just read it without prejudice. Es-
sentially, if you go to that opinion, you'll notice that it starts off with
the plaintiffs-the plaintiffs here being the Delaware Coalition for
Open Government and the defendants being the chancellors and the
vice chancellors of the Court of Chancery of the State of Delaware-
arguing that the First Amendment's qualified right of access prevents
the defendants from concealing these arbitration proceedings from
the public and the press.4 The court, after a lengthy discourse about
all of the salubrious benefits of open court proceedings, et cetera, et
cetera, found that the arbitration regime, because of the confidential
aspect of it, violated the First Amendment of the United States Con-
stitution as applied to the states through the Fourteenth Amendment
of the Constitution.5 In the court's opinion, the confidentiality com-
ponent was found to be violative of the First Amendment.6
But, when you turn to the order, the court enjoins the entire re-
gime.7 Not just the confidentiality piece-the piece that was, in fact,
subject to the challenge. The entire regime, baby and bathwater.
With that very brief summary, I think we can maybe argue the mer-
its of the opinion. When you cut through it all, the court was essen-
tially saying that, without open access to the courts, in some aspects,
we can't trust our justice system. This arbitration regime, which is
administered by the State of Delaware under the auspices of state
funding and state power, even though it's called arbitration and used
by private parties through mutual consent, was, for all intents and pur-
poses, a civil proceeding.
The court looked back to aspects of how proceedings have been
treated historically, whether they have been open to the public or not
open to the public. The court looked at a few cases on point. The
ones that the court focused on primarily and described and explained
were in the context of criminal proceedings.
The court spends a few pages going through a detailed analysis of
those particular cases arising in the criminal proceeding context and
says, for all of these various sundry reasons, it is incredibly important
3. Del. Coal. for Open Gov't v. Strine, 894 F. Supp. 2d 493 (D. Del. 2012).
4. Id. at 497-500.
5. Id. at 504.
6. Id.
7. Order, Del. Coal. for Open Gov't, Inc. v. Strine, 894 F. Supp. 2d 493 (D. Del. 2012) (No.
1:11-1015).
525
526 DEPAUL BUSINESS & COMMERCIAL LAw JOURNAL
to our society-to our democracy, no less-that criminal proceedings
remain open." Candidly, I understand some of the reasons for that
analysis.
With criminal proceedings closed to the public, there's always a risk
of abuse, a risk that people will be unfairly or unjustly prosecuted.
Keeping those proceedings open obviously helps to ensure that people
won't get unfairly prosecuted-and to ensure that the people who do
abuse their powers will be called out for that.
The court then provides a string cite, without much explanation,
that includes the cases that stand for the proposition that civil pro-
ceedings should also be open. 9 The court then basically says, without
much analysis, "Many of the same rationales supporting openness in
criminal trials apply equally to civil trials."' 0
The case is on appeal in the Third Circuit right now. All of the
findings at the district court level will be rehashed at the Third Circuit.
For now, though, they're going to be rehashed on this panel.
A couple of things that I do want to raise to frame this discussion.
One is the court almost assumes that these arbitration proceedings are
civil proceedings and, therefore, should be treated the same as you
would treat a civil proceeding. So let's just accept as true that civil
proceedings have to be open. The court jumps right to the conclusion
that these are basically civil proceedings. Greg, I want to see if you'll
take the "they're not" stance.
GREGORY VARALLO: I'm so glad you gave me that stance be-
cause I would have a really hard time with the other stance. They're
not. Look, because I say so, and that will cost you $30,000.
We went through the form earlier, and one of the provisions of the
form is taking out of the chancellor's hands the right to act in his ca-
pacity as an arbitrator to limit discovery. I would respectfully suggest
to you that if you walked into court tomorrow and said, "Judge, this is
a civil action in Cook County or anywhere else, and we're telling you
because we agree, the parties agree, you're not going to have this
power and that power and the other power," that wouldn't work very
well because you don't have the right to tell the judge in a civil action
what power he or she has. It's simply not available to you.
Arbitration is a creature of contract and is fundamentally different.
In addition, the court just assumed that all arbitrations chartered
8. Strine, 894 F. Supp. 2d at 497-99.
9. Id. at 498.
10. Id.
[Vol. 11:519
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under this regime had been conducted exactly as though they were
civil trials. Well, that's not at all true.
Unfortunately, the state decided to present its case on cross-mo-
tions for summary judgment without any record development-in
other words, serving it up as a pure issue of law-and the court, rely-
ing on the complaint, determined it must be just like a trial.
The record, if it were developed, would show-and I know this be-
cause I did them-that at least the first of these had no discovery, no
appellate rights, no motion practice, and presented purely an issue of
law very much unlike any civil trial I've ever conducted or been in-
volved with.
So not only is the court wrong as a matter of fact-and to be fair to
the court, she didn't have a factual record because of the way the par-
ties presented it-but her assumptions of fact are incorrect. And hon-
estly, I would even challenge John Mark's given, that is, that all civil
proceedings are open.
Her Honor, in her opinion describing the United States Court of
Appeals for the Third Circuit's opinion in First Amendment Coalition
v. Judicial Inquiry & Review Board," explained that at least in the
Third Circuit, there is historically no right of access to administrative
proceedings that is recognized. And I would suggest to you that cer-
tainly there is a right of access to criminal proceedings. Nobody dis-
putes that including myself. And by the way, I'm uncharacteristically
on the far left of this table. It's just not a position I'm very often in.
But even I would agree that there is an enormous public benefit in
having open criminal proceedings at all levels at all times. But that is
not necessarily the public policy, and the rationale behind that doesn't
necessarily port in all its glory to every civil proceeding.
And her Honor recognized that administrative civil proceedings in
the Third Circuit and deportation hearings, for example, which are
also hearings that involve people's liberty, at least at one level, need
not be open to the public notwithstanding the United States
Constitution.
JOHN MARK ZEBERKIEWICZ: Did the court indicate which
administrative proceedings that she is referring to?
GREGORY VARALLO: No. So the court says at page 498 of the
decision, this is describing the Third Circuit, "The Court of Appeals
found no historically recognized right of access to administrative pro-
11. First Amendment Coal. v. Judicial Inquiry & Review Bd., 784 F.2d 467 (3d Cir. 1986) (en
banc).
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ceedings, which use fundamentally different procedures than the judi-
ciary . . . ."12
Well, if you've concluded that administrative proceedings are differ-
ent under the First Amendment because they use fundamentally dif-
ferent procedures and you conclude that civil trials and arbitrations
are otherwise substantively identical, I would suggest that you have
some flawed reasoning in your ratio decidendi, but that's just me.
HON. CLIFFORD MEACHAM: Administrative proceedings in Il-
linois are appealed to the Chancery Court, and they do not-every
administrative hearing is not open to the public. You're exactly right.
So the court's reasoning is flawed in that respect.
In addition, here in Illinois, certain matters can be filed under seal
and/or you can ask the court to have a seal, and oftentimes there is
good reason to do so. The Tribune Company will invariably come in
and say, "We want this information to be released," and they routinely
win in criminal matters, but they do not routinely win in the Circuit
Court of Cook County Chancery Division.
So it's not as if every single case and every single pleading is a mat-
ter of public record. So I completely concur with the analysis. I think
that that was very flawed. Although the worst thing is from my per-
spective I need to ask-Was there a motion to reconsider here?
GREGORY VARALLO: I think they skipped the motion for re-
consideration as a tactical matter because they wanted to bring the
scope ...
HON. CLIFFORD MEACHAM: They wanted to have a record?
GREGORY VARALLO: Yeah, exactly.
HON. CLIFFORD MEACHAM: Pay attention. Sometimes, if you
know the judge is wrong, you don't want to give him a chance to cor-
rect himself. You want to take it right up. I will bet you that this case
will be reversed, and one of the easiest grounds for reversal is who
asked for an injunction. I mean, this is a judge who is taking a very
extraordinary step in entering relief that is not even sought. Wow.
Usually to get an injunction, you need to put on the grounds for an
injunction, particularly a permanent injunction. And for a judge to,
on his or her own motion, essentially say, "I'm enjoining this in total,"
it's mind-boggling to me.
GREGORY VARALLO: I have to tell you, Judge, I was embar-
rassed-I'm not often embarrassed, but I was embarrassed by this
one. When the decision came out, the order-the decision came out
12. Strine, 894 F. Supp. 2d at 498.
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about two hours before the order was issued. And I read the decision
immediately.
My friend was counseling the court and sent me a copy of it. And I
occasionally will go on to my LinkedIn page and put out little blogs
for those who care. Believe it or not, other than my wife and kids,
there are a few who do. I don't understand why, but they do.
And I had been following this, and I sort of blogged into the ether
that, well, don't worry because she's going to allow public arbitrations
to go forward, and some general counsel may find that worthwhile.
And then the order came down, and I was shocked because when you
read the decision right up to the end, she's talking about access and
her reasoning is that it's a closed proceeding and it needs to be
opened.
One would assume, if given the choice between enjoining or stop-
ping closed proceedings or enjoining or stopping all proceedings and
thus striking down a state statute, which federal courts are supposed
to do with only great reluctance, the answer would have been, "I'm
simply ordering going forward that all these proceedings are open." I
then had to un-blog or re-blog or however one corrects oneself in the
blogosphere.
JOHN MARK ZEBERKIEWICZ: If I could defend my partner,
the court's opinion concludes with a statement, "[T]he right of access
applies to the Delaware proceeding created by section 349 of the Del-
aware Code. The portions of that law and Chancery Court Rules 96,
97, and 98, which make the proceeding confidential, violate that right.
An appropriate order shall issue."13 That order then said this whole
thing's unconstitutional and no further proceedings pursuant to the
state under those rules shall be permitted. So that was the appropri-
ate order, getting rid of the portions of the law and the rules.
CHRISTOPHER MARTIN: If I might, the whole idea of confiden-
tiality or openness in civil trials, I would say in my practice, a full 20%
of my cases probably ended like this.
Judge Meacham would say, "Plaintiff, come back to my chambers"
and you would go back and meet with the judge. And now you go out
and send the defendant back, and then both of you come in. And if
you were interested in our case and you were sitting out in the court-
room and we went back in Judge Meacham's chambers and he got us
to a point where we could agree to settle it and we walked out there
and you asked, "What just happened back there?" "I'm not telling
you that."
13. Id. at 504.
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A lot of civil cases end in that way with no public record, no public
access. And not only is it efficient, it usually comes out with a much
better result than you would have gotten if it proceeded to trial.
HON. CLIFFORD MEACHAM: There's no question about it, fi-
nal order, stipulation, and dismissal. For those of you-I have to
make an analogy to criminal law. In Illinois, you can ask for what's
known as a 402 conference. If the state's attorney and the public de-
fender can't agree on a sentence, but they know that the defendant is
going to be found guilty, they'll ask for a 402 conference.
The court goes back in the chambers. The public defender makes a
speech: "A long-standing citizen of Cook County, he's got X and Y in
the way of background." And so we're praying, please God, for a
probation.
And the state's attorney says, "Oh, this guy is the biggest slug in the
world, here are the facts," and the public defender will say, "Oh, pro-
bation." The state's attorney will say, "Six months." And the judge
can then say, "Well, this is what I think. I've been sitting here for
twenty years, and this is exactly like a lot of other cases I've had and,
you know, so far as I'm concerned, if there is a plea agreement, this
would be my sentence."
And then the public defender can go back and talk with his client,
and the state's attorney can go back and attempt to justify why it is to
his supervisor-and sometimes the judge will call up and say, "You
know, your assistant state's attorney argued crazy, but I'm the judge
and this is the sentence," and then they'll go out and essentially if the
state's attorney doesn't want the deal, the judge will look at him and
say, "Well, I appreciate your time, thanks very much," and he'll look
at the defense attorney and say, "Do I hear a plea?" And that's a cue
to the defense attorney, the public defender, "I'm going to give this
guy what I said I was going to give in chambers."
And you don't have that trial. You don't have the full exposition of
all the facts. You don't have the exchange back and forth between the
parties and the judge, and the judge will typically admonish the defen-
dant, "You know, you're waiving all of your rights to trial and jury
trial and all of this." And they'll sit there and the judge will say, "This
is the sentence and the case is over." That's the way it works.
GREGORY VARALLO: I would also say there's an elephant in
the room. It's sort of in the court's opinion. And that is that there are
courts across the country including federal courts that have mandatory
arbitration proceedings if the case is under a certain dollar amount;
certain classes of cases are, by definition, required under the rules of
various district court jurisdictions to go to mandatory arbitration.
[Vol. 11:519
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And it hits me that it's a little bit strange to say to the state you
can't have consensual private arbitration. Remember, nobody's re-
quired these companies to come into chancery to arbitrate. They have
agreed among themselves that they want the judge in a circumstance
where, in many cases, there is not an appeal by agreement. They want
the judge to call it because they have confidence and faith in this par-
ticular judge. They want him to do it.
That's not a circumstance that you have to worry about openness in
the same way you'd have to worry about openness for other kinds of
circumstances. And if that logic holds, then what are you going to do
to the entire system of state and federal court mandatory arbitration
as it exists currently in the United States? I honestly don't get it.
HON. CLIFFORD MEACHAM: I don't get it either, and I will tell
you in the First District Appellate Court and even at the Seventh Cir-
cuit level, they can force people to come off the call and go before a
judge. And it's always a judge, it's not a member of the panel, in
order to attempt to not arbitrate but to mediate their disputes.
So there is this tremendous backlog of cases everywhere, and that's
one of the things that prompted the law to change-when the law
changed in California. And it's also one of the things that prompted
the Chancery and the Law Division mediation rules here.
If it takes you three years to get to trial, your case-in a commercial
case, it's like a diminishing ice cube. The longer it takes, the more it
costs. By the time you finally get your judgment, the next step for
many defendants is Chapter 11 bankruptcy because people will think
about some prebankruptcy planning. Sorry to disillusion you, by the
way. If you're a senior law student, my strong advice is take bank-
ruptcy. You need to know it. It couldn't be more important.
But in any event, time is your enemy. Your case will not get better.
And somebody asked a question-What does that do to my fees?
Well, what does it do to your fees? You're going to work harder for a
shorter period of time, but you will come to closure, which is what
your client wants.
Your client needs certainty. He needs closure. He needs an
endpoint. Because no matter what the result is, whether it's good or
bad, even if it's bad, it's like getting a tooth pulled. Once you know
it's bad, on to the next. Go back and make some more money and do
something else. But don't string it out. It's not in anybody's best in-
terests to do that absent rare circumstances. I'm just giving you my
general philosophy.
CHRISTOPHER MARTIN: If I could chime in really quick on
that. I thought that fee question was an interesting one because you
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kind of condense your work, and so perhaps from a business stand-
point of the firm, you don't stretch out your ability to make money
over a year, two years, three years.
I would say if you do a very good job and this is viewed as a valua-
ble thing to do, you'll finish in ninety days and you will have someone
knocking on your door saying, "Can you take me the next ninety
days?" And so it can actually be a very good thing for your business
model because you will be loaded with work constantly because it's a
valuable service.
JOHN MARK ZEBERKIEWICZ: I want to move to an ancillary
point that the court made, and I want to use a hypothetical that I came
up with as a result of an opinion that was in a public civil proceeding.
But let's assume that it has been done in an arbitration. And so the
court does make the point that, among the benefits of open civil pro-
ceedings, everybody has access to the law. Everybody can watch what
the court's doing, monitor and figure out how to apply the law going
forward. This is one of the great benefits of having precedent. Last
week, the Delaware Court of Chancery issued its opinion in Meso
Scale Diagnostics, LLC v. Roche Diagnostics GmbH.14
About nine months ago, there was a situation where Roche ac-
quired a company called BioVeris through a reverse triangular
merger. In the reverse triangular merger, Roche, as acquirer, dropped
a subsidiary, which it merged with and into. BioVeris survived the
merger. All of the stockholders of BioVeris immediately prior to the
merger got cashed out, and BioVeris ended up as a wholly-owned sub-
sidiary of Roche. So BioVeris was the same company before and after
the merger. It just had a completley different owner.
Meso Scale had a contract with BioVeris that said, in sum, that if a
transfer with respect to the ownership of certain IP licenses is to oc-
cur, Meso Scale would have the opportunity to block it. The narrow
question before the court was whether this reverse triangular merger
resulted in a transfer by operation of law, not a change of control, but
rather a transfer by operation of law of BioVeris's IP rights.
So remember before the merger, BioVeris and its stockholders had
these IP licenses, and then after the merger, BioVeris still had the IP
licenses. It just had a completely different owner. Were those licenses
transferred by operation of law, giving rise to Meso Scale's consent
right? That was the question before the court.
On a motion to dismiss, the court said it was an open issue of Dela-
ware law. As a practitioner, I thought and have always thought it was
14. Meso Scale Diagnostics, LLC v. Roche Diagnostics GmbH., 62 A.3d 62 (Del. Ch. 2013).
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clear cut: same company before and after the merger and, thus, no
transfer. And I think most practitioners had the same view. But then
the case came out on a motion to dismiss, and all of a sudden this is a
real concern. Nine months go by. Then, on summary judgment, the
court releases its opinion. As we had always thought, the reverse tri-
angular merger doesn't result in a transfer by operation of law.
This would have been the perfect case for arbitration in some re-
spects. It's a very narrow contractual provision. It would have been
pretty easy for the parties to just go in and get this issue resolved
within ninety days. The downside to that is that nobody knows the
answer unless there's a public opinion that a reverse triangular merger
is not, in fact, a transfer by operation of law. Does anybody want to
take either side of that now that I've teed it up?
GREGORY VARALLO: The question is, John Mark, that it's
somehow unconstitutional to have proceedings that you can't rely on?
JOHN MARK ZEBERKIEWICZ: Well, the question is-Is the
benefit of having the law out there so important and fundamental to
our society that it would be unconstitutional to prevent this precedent
from being created and available to everyone?
HON. CLIFFORD MEACHAM: Answer, no. There's always an-
other case. I mean, you want to pick your spots, and it seems to me
the fact is that they got their precedent. But does that mean they
shouldn't have considered at least the option of applying to an arbitra-
tor in the same kind of fashion as is contemplated by the statute?
They have that right. You can make a determination on behalf of
your client how you want to proceed. And as long as they're in a
position to make an informed judgment, the courts need, I think, to
stay out of it.
That doesn't mean that the courts stay out of everything. I mean,
there can be-I used the example earlier of a 402 conference. Some-
times a defendant and the state's attorney will come up with a sen-
tence and it's wrong, and the judge has the inherent authority to say,
"No, I am not going to consider that sentence." And sometimes a
judge can, if there are public policy considerations, throw a monkey
wrench into the gears of lawyering. There are times when a judge can
say, "No, I'm not going to consider that," or "I'm not going to con-
sider that at this point in time."
In your case, it was before the judge early, and the judge got a little
shaky. But then after the motions for summary judgment, I assume
cross-motions for summary judgment were fully briefed, now the
court has a record. And judges are loath to enter summary judgment
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because that's the most often reversed order. Sorry, Judge, but no
material issue of fact.
Well, creative lawyers can damn near always find some sort of an
issue of fact. It's the way it is. Cross-motions for summary judgment.
Now you have two people, both of whom are saying there's no mate-
rial issue of fact. Now you can decide.
But to decide a motion for summary judgment where you're not
really satisfied with it, if it's a close case, you're going to say that's
what we're here for. Let's put on your witnesses. Call your first wit-
ness. We'll go to trial. We'll give you a chance to make your record.
And even though I may know the way it's going to come out, not that
judges ever feel that way, even though you know the way it's going to
come out, let them put on their evidence and let's see how the record
develops.
GREGORY VARALLO: I agree, John Mark. I thought you were
going to ask me whether it was inherently unfair that those of us who
do these arbitrations would know how a judge was leaning on a partic-
ular issue. And the answer is, yes, it's unfair, but it's certainly not
unconstitutional in my view.
JOHN MARK ZEBERKIEWICZ: It's nothing that prevents any-
body from hiring us.
HON. CLIFFORD MEACHAM: Always, always, always look into
the background of your arbitrator, your mediator, your judge-al-
ways, particularly in Cook County. I was on a panel-I shouldn't tell
you this story, but I will.
I was at the University of Chicago. This is an august spot, and eve-
rybody was tweedy and bearded, and I'm just a complete Cook
County guy. And so I made this point about you need to know where
this guy comes from. Was he an assistant state's attorney, was he a
public defender, was he a do-gooder? You got to know this stuff.
And I kind of went off on a rant and used my usual colorful lan-
guage. And I said, "Any questions?" One of the professors looked at
me and said, "Well, I wouldn't think that this is the way a circuit court
judge should approach these kinds of serious issues." And I said,
"Ever hear the story about the dog that could play the accordion?"
And he says, "No, what's that?" "There was a dog that was playing an
accordion and he was playing Lady of Spain, and there were two law
professors who were watching. And one of the law professors looked
at the other one and said, 'You know, that dog, I mean, what a selec-
tion, what a selection.' The other law professor said, 'Not only that,
he missed several notes in the first bar,' to which a real live person
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who was sitting next to him says, 'You know, you guys kind of missed
the point. First of all, it's a dog.'"
So that made me real popular. Although one of the students appre-
ciated it afterwards and I said, "You're the one who's going to go far
in this entire class." You got to be a practical human being. You need
to know what the territory is like.
In Delaware, they have wonderful, competent chancellors, unlike
the Circuit Court of Cook County where they're sort of kind of
elected. But talk to people. Develop your network. Talk to your
partners. These guys do it all the time.
It's assigned to such and such a judge. What are his predilections?
Some judges make you stand up when you object. Some judges are
very formal. Some judges are much less formal. You need to know
where you're operating, what the territory is like.
CHRISTOPHER MARTIN: I would absolutely agree with that.
Especially if you're going to be practicing here in Cook County; you
have to know the judges. I would go farther than that. Know the
judges, know the clerks, know everyone that you can in the court-
rooms because they can all help you. If you're a good person and nice
to them, it will help.
HON. CLIFFORD MEACHAM: Always, always, always. The
clerks, you have no idea. The court staff is a family. You have the
judge. You have the deputy. You have the law clerks. And if you go
in there and give the clerk a hard time, you can rest assured that that
clerk will tell everybody else what a jerk you are.
And you need to know that in Chicago, if you look at Sullivan's,
there are a million lawyers, right? But judges talk. And if you get
caught going in the wrong direction, everybody in that judge's division
will know about it and soon.
Your word as a lawyer is the most important tool you have. It
doesn't matter how smart you are. Your word as a lawyer-if you say
you're going to do something, you do it. And the law is always prac-
ticed in the gray. If it's black or white, you're going to win or you're
going to lose. So don't go in there and argue bad precedent. Don't go
in there and act like a nitwit. Don't be hyperaggressive. If you're
going to be real arrogant, you better be real smart. Because the worst
thing you can do is make the judge your enemy.
The judge always has the last word, and he can sit there and listen
to it, and the judge will still follow the law and get it right. But again,
you want to be a right guy. It's always easier when they like you.
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JOHN MARK ZEBERKIEWICZ: I want to stay on the topic of
integrity and continue that thread. Among the other benefits that the
district court identified, and I'll just quote directly from the opinion,
"Public scrutiny discourages witness perjury and promotes confidence
in the integrity of the courts."' 5 Is there a real concern that if we have
these closed proceedings, some of the witnesses, maybe even the law-
yers, would be less forthright?
GREGORY VARALLO: No lawyer I know would be more or less
forthcoming because the matter was open or not. I think at a certain
level of practice, if you're going to be representing clients before the
Court of Chancery, you better assume a certain level of integrity or
you're in trouble, as the judge said, very quickly.
And as far as perjury goes, I practiced for a long time. I've only
seen one case, one clear case of perjury in a trial, and the fellow was
referred to the prosecutorial services and convicted in absentia to five
years in jail for fabricating a document in a business case.
CHRISTOPHER MARTIN: I would also say that people are-peo-
ple are under oath outside of the public view all the time. We take
depositions, and those are not in the public view. Ask former Presi-
dent Clinton whether being under oath in a deposition saves you from
telling the truth. It doesn't.
Clients sign affidavits under oath all the time as part of settlement.
Instead of producing records, they might say, "These are our sales,
and I'm telling you this under oath." And no one ever sees that. It
doesn't affect the veracity of the document or the statements. So I
would disagree with that.
Also, just going back to the whole idea of whether this will harm the
development of the law because they are in private. You know, we've
had private arbitrations for a long time now, and I would say the law
has muddled along just fine in its development, and I don't think the
courts are lacking for litigation.
HON. CLIFFORD MEACHAM: You should look forward to soon
practicing law, and it is, I will tell you from my perspective, the great
profession. I mean, it is wonderful. It is fun. I mean, it can be deadly
serious. You will meet wonderful people. You will learn an enormous
amount about a lot of different things.
You will see wonderful-you'll see humanity at its absolute best
and its absolute worst. It's above, I mean, it is just-you have no idea
what your future holds for you. Look forward to it, embrace it.
15. Strine, 894 F. Supp. 2d at 504.
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And there's one other thing-if you're going to practice in Cook
County, there's an outfit called Chicago Volunteer Legal Services
(CVLS). Sign up with CVLS. There are a lot of people out there that
need lawyers.
You'll get a case from CVLS every once in a while. They have a
tremendous staff and a tremendous number of people who volunteer
to serve clients. You will be a do-gooder. You will help people who
need it. You will exponentially expand your networking ability.
You'll meet people from giant firms, medium firms, small firms, and
you will get cases from them and be able to send cases to them. Make
a contribution to make this profession even better. It's easy to sit
back and make a lot of money and all this and that sort of stuff, but
demand more of yourself. It's a service-oriented occupation. Serve
some.
CHRISTOPHER MARTIN: I absolutely agree with that. I keep a
couple of-I've got a couple of old pro bono clients, some poor South
Side churches that always get themselves in trouble. And I still re-
present them just because (a) I like to be in the courtroom just to
keep myself fresh. I think if you sit in a classroom all the time and
don't practice, you get stale. And (b) just because they're great peo-
ple who just can't afford representation, and they constantly get them-
selves in trouble. They need it.
HON. CLIFFORD MEACHAM: You get those clients year after
year after year.
CHRISTOPHER MARTIN: Yes.
HON. CLIFFORD MEACHAM: I have to tell you one final story.
I probably shouldn't. But when you talk about South Side churches
when I was sitting in the mechanics' lien section, I had a construction
case. A poor South Side church general contractor comes in. They
make the mistake of giving them all the money, terrible, he evapo-
rates. In the meantime, a material supplier has delivered a bunch of
stuff to the site, and the plaintiff is represented pro bono by Chester
Blair, former president of the Chicago Bar Association, wonderful
guy. And the defendant is represented by a lawyer, a local lawyer by
the name of Burton Brown, great guy. He does all kinds of volunteer
work.
And every time the case was up, the courtroom is filled with the
elders. There are about seventeen elders. And it wasn't a tremendous
amount of money, but it was more than the church had. So one day
the case is up again, and we're all kind of doing this. Burton Brown
says, "Well, you know, my guy, he doesn't want to make anything and
he's going to lose something, but here's what he's willing to do. If
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these people can come up with this much money, we'll go away, and
the lien comes off the church and they can go forward."
And so we were pretty much in the ballpark and had everybody
take a step closer so the elders couldn't hear, and I said, "What about
it, Mr. Blair?" And he said, "Okay, I'll write them a check, too."
"What about it, Mr. Brown?" "Okay, I'll write them a check, too."
And I looked at both of them and said, "On Sunday, there are going
to be three checks in the basket, one from Mr. Blair, one from Mr.
Brown, and one from an anonymous person who will never, ever ad-
mit to it." And I swear to God, my law clerk said, "There's going to
be four checks in the basket," and it happened so, you know.
GREGORY VARALLO: We're totally convinced this opinion is
unconstitutional, and it's going to be reversed by the Third Circuit. I
will say that the law firm of Mayer Brown is representing the judges
on this appeal. The State of Delaware and the court had the good
sense to go outside the state to find an excellent appellate advocate.
Apparently it's a lawyer from Chicago.
HON. CLIFFORD MEACHAM: Ty Fahner?
GREGORY VARALLO: I think so.
HON. CLIFFORD MEACHAM: My former boss, former Attorney
General of the State of Illinois, one of the great lawyers of the world.
GREGORY VARALLO: And the question is whether we wind up
in the United States Supreme Court one day or not. In the meantime,
we are doing our best to muddle along arbitrating cases with retired
judges, and we're blessed with a number of them in Delaware that are
very fine judges and neutrals.
And I guess the question is-Having exhausted the subject of con-
stitutionality, what else can we productively talk about? You guys are
every day thinking about these things actively as you're going through
your classes. You've got a panel up here that ranges the gamut in
terms of our experience and what we do. You've heard a lot of differ-
ent things from us. What's on your minds?
AUDIENCE MEMBER: I had a question. I guess this goes to con-
stitutionality, but having just skimmed the memo, I know we discussed
sort of a judicial obligation to set precedent. But in the qualified First
Amendment right of access for the public, I saw more of a right to
notice to understand how companies are performing business and to
potentially amend your consumer behavior or just to have an aware-
ness perhaps as a deterrent for companies to act in certain ways. And
I think that in some senses, like, that's how I read the First Amend-
ment, that right to know.
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JOHN MARK ZEBERKIEWICZ: I think that's part and parcel
with the whole idea of witnesses not perjuring themselves and the
whole idea of proceedings being open for the integrity of the law and
the process and companies being monitored. I think the whole thing
is kind of throughout this opinion. All of those issues are blended
together and really merge.
GREGORY VARALLO: I would also say, though, that the law im-
poses on companies the obligation to disclose material things about
their business, either by 10-Ks or proxy statements or quarterly re-
ports when they're public. And to the extent that you're positing or
the judge is positing a duty that goes beyond the federal scheme of
disclosure regulation, I don't think that you can find a principled basis
for that in the First Amendment.
You've got to disclose what you've got to disclose. To the extent
what her Honor is saying is, and you need to go beyond that because
there's integrity in having knowledge out there, the problem quickly
becomes how much knowledge needs to be out there. If you're al-
ready beyond the statutory scheme, do you need to disclose a little bit
more or do you need to disclose a lot more, or how does that work?
And as we've indicated earlier, there are lots of times companies in
this situation are in court-ordered mediation or arbitration or other
ADR that's not public, and that just doesn't seem to match up with a
principled analysis under the First Amendment.
HON. CLIFFORD MEACHAM: There's another point, too, in ad-
dition to the disclosure requirements, for example, under the SEC.
You mentioned consumers. There are consumer fraud and deceptive
trade practices acts in virtually every state in this nation in addition to
the little SEC actions.
So there are attorneys general all over the place that if they find an
unfair act or practice in trade or commerce, they're going to jump into
it. A good example is the litigation with respect to the mortgage fore-
closure robo-signings and the like. There are a lot of different ways to
get a result.
What we're talking about, I think, is much narrower private litiga-
tion as opposed to litigation that really does have an impact upon the
public at large.
GREGORY VARALLO: And I would also say that the way this is
set up, by definition, you've got to certify that it's not a consumer
matter. So that whole sort of area gets excised out of the scheme to
begin with.
AUDIENCE MEMBER: But making it public could still illuminate
that they had no-even if it's between two corporations, if one corpo-
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ration is shown to have acted in negligence or willful and wanton be-
havior, access to scientific information that a certain product is deadly
to its own employees, for instance, and one is suing the other.
JOHN MARK ZEBERKIEWICZ: The same argument would ap-
ply to a private arbitration that doesn't involve the state, right?
CHRISTOPHER MARTIN: That's what I'm wondering. I feel like
I'm missing something, but I don't think I am. Because it's not as if
enforcing this judgment is going to make all this public now. They'll
just go find a retired judge and do the exact same thing.
You'll lose the advantages that have been established by using these
chancery judges, which provide a great benefit at no greater cost to
the public. So I guess I'm missing something because it seems like ...
JOHN MARK ZEBERKIEWICZ: It's somehow using the instru-
mentality of the state, it is argued, that pulls that out. I just don't
know what it is because you take your example. I hear you. You
think maybe it is beneficial to have some knowledge about these
things and to have that all be open. But all of this can be done
through private arbitration that doesn't involve the state in any way.
It's just that now you've got this instrument of the State of Delaware
coming in, you're able to make this argument that closing it down to
the public is a terrible thing, even though we know that you can do
that anyway. It's just you don't have Chancellor Strine. You have a
neutral.
CHRISTOPHER MARTIN: And I can tell you from practicing
here that the chancery judges in Illinois are excellent judges. I find
them some of the most knowledgeable, and if I was picking someone
to do an arbitration, I would-You don't agree?
HON. CLIFFORD MEACHAM: One of the first things I ask every
time I do an arbitration or mediation is, "Tell me the judge you hate
most in the Circuit Court of Cook County," and sometimes they'll tell
me. Again, I'm being silly. He's absolutely right. Chancery judges
are from top to bottom ...
CHRISTOPHER MARTIN: So if we could do that here, and it
would be a tremendous source of revenue for the courts, which they
need badly, and by barring it, barring this, all you're doing is pushing
them into private arbitration; it makes no sense. I guess I understand
the First Amendment argument, but the common-sense practical out-
come of this is horrible. It just doesn't make sense. It's bad all the
way around.
GREGORY VARALLO: You know, your point about pushing it to
private arbitration-for large corporations, more and more and more,
you're seeing cross-border deals. So we've got Brazil, we've got Chile.
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We've got various Latin American countries that are strong and grow-
ing, and many large U.S. companies are forming joint ventures or
other business relationships with them.
So you've got radically different legal systems half a world away,
and what do you see? You see ICC arbitration or arbitration before
the Singapore Tribunal, these established arbitrable tribunals. Well,
as a nation-and I don't want to get too pompous about this. But as a
nation, if you are effectively pushing cross-border work to the foreign
arbitral bodies, there's nothing wrong with that, but we're losing the
opportunity to do that work here. And why not? If we've got a U.S.
company, why not give them access to that kind of service here?
SAM FAYE: You all seem to agree on the constitutionality of the
program and that the order will be reversed. And obviously we've
discussed that much of it is very particular to Delaware and the way
Delaware functions. But do you see benefits from the program that
could be kind of extracted from it, assuming this is overturned and
goes forward, that could be taken out and used as a framework in
other states? Obviously, the abortion issue attached as a rider to an
arbitration proposition would kill a similar program almost anywhere.
But if this is reversed and does go forward being successful in Dela-
ware, do you see other states potentially looking at this as a potential
revenue maker, especially states that are strapped for cash and can in
a way adapt their own state-run version of the same thing that AAA
or JAMS does to try and generate revenue for the state rather than
private forums?
HON. CLIFFORD MEACHAM: I would be amazed if it wasn't
considered by other states. Other states don't have the panache of
Delaware, but they also don't have the-there is a pretty steep entry
fee in Delaware to take advantage of this system, and not everybody is
in a position to come up with that kind of money in order to get access
to the program.
So I would predict that other states that might do it may do so on a
more limited scale with perhaps a reduction in the amount, both the
amount in controversy, a million or less, and the amount to really im-
plement it. That would be my prediction. But I wouldn't be at all
surprised to see this really be replicated in a lot of different places.
CHRISTOPHER MARTIN: In the break, I was telling them that
we steal ideas from Delaware all the time. We have a series LLC in
Illinois now that we took from Delaware. And given the fact that we
do have the Chancery Division here, which most states do not-most
states do not divide out their equity and law into separate courts-it
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would be something that I think could be replicated here pretty easily
to be honest.
GREGORY VARALLO: You'll be surprised to find I don't disa-
gree with you. I think that individual local politics will play a role in
how easy it is to adopt. One of the things we've seen in the last twenty
years anyway has been a movement towards business divisions and
business courts across the country, and it's been very successful.
Many of those divisions or courts have been modeled on the Delaware
Court of Chancery.
I know that when North Carolina started its own chancery court,
Ben Tenille was the first chancellor. And he was a smart fellow, and
the first thing he did was he came up to Delaware and spent several
months effectively sitting on the bench with the Delaware chancellors
learning how they did it, then brought it back to North Carolina. And
they've now grown that court to two or three judges.
I know Philadelphia, for example, has a commercial division. New
York is pushing very hard to breathe life into its commercial division.
And given how that movement has taken hold over the years, I see
very little reason why other courts, to the extent this is doable,
wouldn't pick up with it.
And you know, look, Delaware is where it is by having stolen New
Jersey's corporation law. We did it because there was a fellow called
Woodrow Wilson who was governor of New Jersey and decided he
was going to start messing with their large corporations, and we said,
"Come on over," and it worked.
Nevada took our law in the 1970s. It didn't work because they
didn't have the bar and the judiciary and the legislature working to-
gether. But if you look at the Nevada corporation law, it looks a lot
like the Delaware corporation law. So imitation is a sincere form of
flattery, and there ought to be experimentation with this, and it ought
to be tailored to the individual circumstances of each court.
Because ultimately, if this means that the hardworking judges of
those courts wind up having fewer public trials to do and can wash a
lot of these cases out in arbitration or in mediation or in some other
form of ADR, the public in general is better off.
HON. CLIFFORD MEACHAM: Questions?
SAM FAYE: Do you guys have any last final words to add?
GREGORY VARALLO: I got one for you. You had an Edward
Bennett Williams story. I just have to share one of mine. I happen to
be working with that firm currently. I don't know if Williams is alive.
But it's an apocryphal story. A number of years ago, apparently Mr.
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Williams was in a conference room with his clients and a young associ-
ate, a very young associate came bursting in and said, "Mr. Williams,
justice has prevailed. What should we do?" And Williams without
missing a beat looked up and said, "Well, gosh darn it, take an
appeal."
SAM FAYE: On that note, I want to thank everyone for coming.
It's been a great day. Thank you to our speakers especially; I really
appreciate your time. Thank you both for taking the time to travel
here and participate with us, and I hope everyone enjoys the rest of
his or her afternoon and evening. Let me know if anyone has any
questions in regards to today's program.

